LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CENTER OF GRAVITY -STILL RELEVANT AFTER ALL THESE YEARS
Clausewitz introduced center of gravity in On War: "Aus ihnen wird sich ein gewissen Schwerpunkt, ein Zentrum der Kraft und Bewegung bilden, von welchem das Ganze abhangt, und auf diesen Schwerpunkt des Gegners muss der gesammelte Stoss aller Krafte gerichtet sein."
1 Der Schwerpunkt comes from the study of mechanics and translates as "center of gravity." J.J. Graham, in his 1873 translation writes, "Out of them a certain centre of gravity, a centre of power and movement, will form itself, on which everything depends; and against this centre of gravity of the enemy, the concentrated blow of all the forces must be directed."
2 Howard and Paret's more recent translation of this key passage is, "Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE -WHY CENTER OF GRAVITY?
Two major forces influenced Clausewitz's writing. First, his experiences in campaigns against France provided him extensive combat experience. Second, he lived at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, a period marked with major developments in applied mathematics and the sciences. LaGrange and Laplace (Ecole Polytechnique in Paris) and
Euler (Saint Petersburg and Berlin) published extensively on applied physics and mechanics.
Gauss, considered the greatest scientific mind of the time, completed extensive work in applied mathematics, mechanics, and physics in Gottingen. It is no small wonder that Clausewitz drew from the scientific studies of his time for analogies in his own writing. Another passage from On
War reflects the impact of the scientific revolution on Clausewitz's writing.
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is unconceivable unless one has experienced war...This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance.
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Clausewitz takes the concept of friction as a force of resistance from mechanics and uses it to describe the complexities and chance phenomena in war that preclude the reduction of warfare to some straight-forward mathematical analysis.
Clausewitz's use of center of gravity is also tied to another analogy he uses early in On
War. "Wir wollen hier nicht erst in eine schwerfailige publizistische defintion des krieges hineinsteigen, sondern uns an das element desselben halten, an den zweikampf. Der Krieg is nichts als ein erweiterter zweikampf." 7 Graham translates this passage, "we shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale." 8 Howard and Paret translate this piece, "I shall not begin by expounding a pedantic, literary definition of war, but go straight to the heart of the matter, to the duel. War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale." 9 However, a literal translation of zweikampf is "two-struggle" or "man to man tussle."
10
Clausewitz compares war to a wrestling match, just executed on a much larger scale. In a wrestling match, two opponents grapple with each other. Each is looking for that single point by which the opponent may be toppled to the floor, the center of gravity.
JOINT DOCTRINE: THE SOURCE OF CONFUSION
Center of gravity analysis first appeared in joint doctrine in the 1993 Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Joint Publication 3-0 defines the term as "that characteristic, capability, or location from which alliances, nations, and military forces derive their will to fight, their physical strength, or freedom of action." 11 This definition borrows from Clausewitz's principle of center of gravity and refers to a single center of gravity. The use of capability in the definition is not in agreement with Clausewitz's writings. The center of gravity is the source of the enemy's strength: the military force, the capital, the national will. The center of gravity has capabilities, but a capability is not the center of gravity. Joint force commanders should attack enemy centers of gravity directly. If direct attack is not possible, indirect means of defeating the enemy center of gravity should be executed by attacking through weak or vulnerable points.
The joint doctrine has inconsistencies, though, that confuse center of gravity analysis. Joint Publication 3-0 makes contradictory statements about a single center of gravity existing, then discussing determining and attacking multiple centers of gravity. The doctrine fails to specify whether a single center of gravity exists at each level of war, or there can be multiple centers of gravity at each level. Also, while the joint doctrine correctly differentiates between center of gravity and decisive points (a decisive point is not a center of gravity, it is a key to attacking the enemy center of gravity), Joint Publication 3-0 then returns to the capability aspect of the joint definition in that "at the strategic level, centers of gravity might include...a set of critical capabilities or functions." 12 If an invading enemy force is the center of gravity, their ability to conduct amphibious operations (a capability) is not the center of gravity. It is an aspect of the opposing force that might be vulnerable to attack to defeat the center of gravity (the force).
The 1995 COGs." 16 The same confusion is generated when force projection is discussed. "During early entry operations, US forces and ports of debarkation often will be friendly COGs." 17 So, locations or potential decisive points can be centers of gravity. The source of all these contradictions and confusion can be traced back to the development of joint doctrine. Each service must approve joint doctrine prior to publishing. Therefore, definitions and concepts are watered down to the least common factor to satisfy all the services' perspectives. Such practices, coupled with service parochialism, can result in a lack of focus or incorrect determinations in the planning process at one of the regional commands. These problems are especially troublesome for planners since the joint doctrine includes strategic and operational center of gravity analysis as one of the primary steps in the situation analysis of the estimate process for joint campaign planning.
MUDDYING THE WATERS -SERVICE PERSPECTIVES
The "watering down" of the joint definition for center of gravity leaves each service to re- As with any complex organism, some components are more vital than others to the smooth and reliable operation of the whole. If these are damaged or destroyed, their loss unbalances the entire structure, producing a cascading deterioration in cohesion and effectiveness which may result in complete failure, and which will invariably leave the force vulnerable to further damage.
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Army doctrine did not specifically identify these vital components as candidates for the center of gravity or as critical vulnerabilities, which can be used to attack the center of gravity. Doctrine then defines:
the center of gravity of an armed force as those sources of strength or balance. It is that characteristic, capability, or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Clausewitz defined it as the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. Its attack is -or should be -the focus of all operations.
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Army doctrine has now linked center of gravity directly to Clausewitz's definition. Doctrine, however, indicated that the center of gravity is not the force itself, but some other aspect of the force. Clausewitz would look at the force being the center of gravity, and the other aspects as 
THE NAVY: NEW KID ON THE BLOCK
The United States Navy defines the center of gravity in Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP 1) as "that characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." 27 With minor word changes, this definition follows directly from the joint definition for center of gravity from the 1993 Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. NDP 1 is a first effort by the Navy to lay out the doctrine for employment of Naval forces for "war over the sea" or "war on the sea." A critical look on how this definition is incorporated into the doctrine is necessary to see how the Navy truly interprets the center of gravity concept.
In the "how to fight" chapter, the navy doctrine states that "modern maneuver warfare requires integration and understanding of four key concepts -center of gravity, critical vulnerability, focus of effort, and main effort." 28 Here we see an initial signal that the Navy will differentiate between center of gravity and means to attack it (critical vulnerabilities). NDP 1 then states:
The center of gravity is something the enemy must have to continue military operations -a source of his strength, but not necessarily strong or a strength in itself. There can only be one center of gravity. Once identified, we focus all aspects of our military, economic, diplomatic, and political strengths against it.
As an example, a lengthy resupply line supporting forces engaged at a distance from the home front could be an enemy's center of gravity ... Opportunities to access and destroy a center of gravity are called critical vulnerabilities.
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This passage has many inconsistencies that complicate discussion of center of gravity. First,
the Navy doctrine appears to agree with the Clausewitzian idea that the center of gravity is singular. However, the Navy doesn't discuss center of gravity in reference to levels of war.
Next, the Navy doctrine states that the center of gravity is "not necessarily strong or a strength itself." This idea is opposite of Clausewitz's notion of the center of gravity as the hub of all power. However, the doctrine then requires, as Clausewitz and the Army demand, that all elements of power focus on the defeat of the center of gravity. Unfortunately, the doctrine falls into the trap of identifying a long supply line (a critical vulnerability) as the center of gravity for a military force (the potential center of gravity). The definition then contradicts itself by separating center of gravity from critical vulnerabilities.
NDP 1 tries to clarify the difference between center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities in the following passage:
The appearance of critical vulnerabilities depends entirely upon the situation and specific objective. Some -such as electrical power generation and distribution facilities ashore or the fleet oilers supporting a task group -may be obvious. On a strategic level, examples may include a nation's dependence on a certain raw material imported by sea to support its warfighting industry, or its dependence on a single source of intelligence data as the primary basis for its decisions. Alternatively, a critical vulnerability might be an intangible, such as morale. In any case, we define critical vulnerabilities by the central role they play in maintaining or supporting the enemy's center of gravity, and, ultimately, his ability to resist.
30
This list is in agreement with the Army focus on getting to the center of gravity through associated vulnerabilities. The doctrine challenges the Navy commander to "direct the focus of effort toward attacking the critical vulnerabilities so that he can ultimately collapse the enemy's center of gravity." 
THE MARINE CORPS: CORRECTION -COG ≠ CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES!
The 1989 Fleet Marine Forces Manual 1 (FMFM 1) outlined the Marine Corps doctrine for maneuver warfare, drawing heavily from Clausewitz. FMFM 1 addresses Clausewitzian concepts such as friction and uncertainty in war, complexity, the human dimension, war as an act of policy, and centers of gravity. The Marine Corps warfighting manual states "that the most effective way to defeat our enemy is to destroy that which is most critical to him. We should focus our efforts on the one thing which, if eliminated, will do the most decisive damage to his ability to resist us. Which factors are critical to the enemy? Which can the enemy not do without? Which, if eliminated, will bend him most quickly to our will? These are centers of gravity. Depending on the situation, centers of gravity may be intangible characteristics such as resolve or morale."
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Referencing warfighting doctrine that seeks to find weaknesses to exploit and attack, MCDP 1 asks where is the enemy most vulnerable, in order to effect an attack against centers of gravity.
Therefore, we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy's ability to resist us... However, we should recognize that most enemy systems will not have a single center of gravity on which everything else depends ... It will often be necessary to attack several lesser centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities simultaneously.
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While now differentiating between center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, the Marine Corps still advocates the existence of multiple centers of gravity. The doctrine confuses the issue by allowing for attacks on lesser centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities simultaneously. The idea of a lesser center of gravity is contradictory to the Clausewitzian notion for the concept.
USEFULNESS OF CENTER OF GRAVITY TODAY
Center of gravity analysis is a critical step in campaign planning as outlined in the 25
January 2002 Because the adversary's COG will most likely be heavily defended, the indirect approach may offer the most viable method to exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses by attacking them along decisive points. While decisive points are not COGs, they are essential in attacking COGs.
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In either case, to attack the enemy center of gravity, the commander must find those critical vulnerabilities that lead to defeat of the center of gravity. Unfortunately, Joint Publication 5.00-1 fails to address the issue of how to determine the center of gravity. "From a procedural perspective, the analysis of the adversary's COGs is a key step in the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) process. In the third of four steps in the JIPB process, joint force intelligence analysts identify adversary COGs," 50 and refers the reader to Joint Planners must be cognizant that the center of gravity at any level can change, as the strategic or theater situation changes. The arguments for multiple centers of gravity refer to On War for justification. A careful examination of On War, however, reveals that in the twenty-eight separate references to center of gravity, all but two refer to the concept as a single entity. In the other cases, Clausewitz discusses narrowing down center of gravity candidates to find one source of power. "The first principle is that the ultimate substance of enemy strength must be traced back to the fewest possible sources, ideally to one alone." 51 Clausewitz then goes on to discuss the conditions and some examples of reducing multiple sources of strength to a single center of gravity. Clausewitz then addresses the other possibility of not being able to reduce the multiple strengths to one. "There are very few cases where this conception is not applicablewhere it would not be realistic to reduce several centers of gravity to one. Where this is not so, there is admittedly no alternative but to act as if there were two wars or even more, each with its own object." 52 In the study of physics and mechanics, center of gravity is defined as the single point at which the entire mass of an object is located or the point where the total weight of a material body is thought to be concentrated. Putting his writings in context with the emphasis on science in his era, a strong argument can be made that Clausewitz intended for center of gravity to be a single entity.
Given this definition, a general methodology is proposed to determine the center of gravity. Arguments erupt at this point over whether center of gravity determination is science or art. As Joint Publication 5-00.1 clearly states, "identifying COGs is an analytical process that involves both art and science." 
FIGURE 2. DISCIPLE-COG SCENARIO ELICITATION WINDOW
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In the example shown in figure 3 , Disciple is examining the "will of the United Nations (UN)" as a strategic center of gravity candidate for the UN coalition in the Korean War. Based on a comparison of this candidate to the others and an examination of critical capabilities and requirements, Disciple eliminates will of the UN as a strategic center of gravity candidate. In a recent exercise conducted at the U.S. Army War College, seven different historical campaigns were investigated using Disciple. The use of this agent resulted in a fifty percent reduction in the size of the strategic center of gravity candidate pool. Feedback from the officers conducting the work also emphasized the reduction in time to analyze the campaigns. Also, participants appreciated a methodical process to focus information gathering on all possible factor areas for candidates for the center of gravity. In each case, Disciple reduced the list of candidates to two or three. Then, the experience and intuition of the military officer was the critical addition for actual determination of the center of gravity. While Disciple currently can only focus on the strategic center of gravity for both sides, research is continuing to include the theater-strategic and operational levels of war in the next year.
FIGURE 3. CENTER OF GRAVITY JUSTIFICATION
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Center of gravity analysis has been the subject of many articles since the concept was re-introduced into doctrine by the Army in FM100-5. Differing service perspectives, confusing definitions and language in joint doctrine, and multiple interpretations of Clausewitz's writings have contributed to "muddying the waters" when it comes to the usefulness of center of gravity.
As Commander Jeff Huber wrote in 2000, "The center of gravity theory won't wash if it takes a Zen master decades of rumination from atop the highest peak in Tibet to apply it." 60 A common language and understanding of the concept is required. The inclusion of Dr. Joe Strange's model into joint doctrine provides new clarity to the meaning of center of gravity. An unambiguous definition for center of gravity is available if plural references to center of gravity are removed from the language of the new Joint Publication 5.00-1. Joint doctrine should incorporate a basic methodology for center of gravity determination. A blending of science and art can be achieved using the CSL model and subsequent modification currently being worked.
Center of gravity is not dead, it is an integral part of U.S. military doctrine and planning. After more than 160 years, it is still a relevant and useful concept for focusing planning on the defeat of the enemy. As Clausewitz said himself, "Far from believing we have discovered a new technique, we are merely providing a rationale for the actions of every general in history, which serves to explain their connection with the nature of the problem."
61
WORD COUNT = 6492
ENDNOTES
